1 2 discredited, opening the door to a monetarist view of economics 4 which favored control of budget deficits as a pathway to low inflation and economic stability.
Given the centrality of budgetary financing to domestic political initiatives; however, these austerity pressures posed a threat to a government's national autonomy and social responsiveness.
Fiscal discipline might help promote economic stability by improving a country's credit standing, but the extent to which austerity necessitated deep budget cuts it simultaneously jeopardized social stability. Moreover, for those governments hoping to use Keynesian countercyclical policies -or fiscal stimulus to offset an economic downturn -there was often very little scope for deficit spending beyond those expenditures dedicated to foreign interest payments. In light of this debt-induced austerity, many Latin American countries have sought to insulate themselves from financial market scrutiny by searching for alternative funding sources.
In this paper, I show that China's rapid economic expansion into the Western Hemisphere has provided Latin American countries with such a funding source that is independent of global financial markets. Governments that directly access new income streams from China are able to enhance their budgetary sovereignty through two primary channels: non-conditional government-to-government lending and taxable commodity flows. New government revenues from these sources are not contingent upon a country's macroeconomic policy stance, enabling governments the flexibility to veer from fiscal discipline, the hallmark of market governance. For example, Chinese financing today accounts for more than two-thirds of the Ecuadorean government's borrowing needs, helping finance a widening deficit that has averaged about 1.5 percent since the 2008 global financial crisis (which not coincidently also marks China's first foray into Ecuadorean lending) compared to a lofty budget surplus during the previous four years. Global Investment Tracker; Inter-American Dialogue's China and Latin America Finance Database) . 4 Monetarism diagnosed inflation as a supply-side excess that could be cured with balanced budgets.
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Not all governments, however, seek to directly secure such new budgetary financing, creating considerable variation in Chinese funding streams throughout the region. Some governments may have high economic interdependence with China, but they do not attempt to raise new government revenues by either implementing trade taxes or tapping direct Chinese sovereign lending. Rather, these governments are more market-oriented, and hence, more likely to fund their unfulfilled public services by either raising more revenues through domestic taxes or offering government concessions to the private sector. Given the need to court private investors, they are also more likely to pursue budget discipline to signal their good credit standing to private investors. For example, to sustain public investment in Colombia, the government has announced a US$30 billion infrastructure program, financed by private capital though concessions. It has also increased income, corporate, and financial transaction taxes to maintain fiscal sustainability, an important governance criteria for attracting global financing into Colombia. According to current Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas, "the anchor of the whole [governance] structure is fiscal responsibility, and that has actually provided us with very positive results...that of course have been rewarded by the markets." 5 I exploit this variation in the type of sovereign financing to test whether Chinese financing streams enhance Latin America's economic policy autonomy, and ultimately, yield higher deficit spending. My comparative case study of three Latin American countries -Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela -finds that when governments tap revenues from Chinese trade and non-conditional lending, they are more likely to use high budget deficits to intervene in the domestic economy. By comparison, those governments that continue to depend on global private capital markets for a large portion of their financing are more likely to exhibit budget discipline.
These findings offer new insights for studies examining globalization, neoliberalism, and the 5 Colombian Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas' remarks at the 2014 IMF/World Bank annual meetings.
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Latin American left, which have found considerable variation in the extent of government intervention in national economies. On one side of these debates, scholars have contended that economic integration (Rudra 2002; , global capital markets (Mosley 2000 (Mosley , 2003 Wibbels 2006) , and international financial institutions (Vreeland 2003 ; also see Nelson 2015) have led to a retrenchment of Keynesian-style countercyclical fiscal policies in developing countries, including budget deficits and social safety nets. In support of this view, scholars have found that a variety of factors, including a weak labor movement (Roberts 1998 (Roberts , 2002 , party-brand dilution (Lupu 2015) , strong business interests (Thacker 2000 , Schneider 2004 Fairfield 2010 Fairfield , 2011 , centrist economic voters and increasingly non-economic voters (Baker 2008; Baker and Greene 2011; Hellwig 2014) , and reform-seeking politicians (Corrales 2000) helped facilitate a broad-based acceptance of this neoliberal consensus (Roberts 1998; Stokes 2001; Murillo 2001; Murillo 2002; Weyland 2002; Levitsky 2003) . Notwithstanding such policy retrenchment, other scholars have found that neoliberal reforms have not been uniform. Rather, many countries with import substitution industrialization legacies (ISI) have crafted political bargains (Frieden 1991 ) that preserved supply side interventions in the economy, including industrial promotion, public employment (Kurtz and Brooks 2008) , and social insurance (Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011) . To date, however, there has been relatively scant indication that even these ISI countries maintained much macroeconomic flexibility (Kurtz and Brooks 2008) .
In this paper, I engage with this important issue, showing that the emergence of Chinese state-led financing has helped remove the budget constraint imposed by the International Monetary Fund (Vreeland 2003) and global financial markets (Mosley 2003; Wibbels 2006 ) throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. This additional fiscal space has allowed some governments to engage in greater macroeconomic intervention, mainly through considerably higher budget deficits.
This study also has significant implications for scholars examining the rise of China in Latin 5 America. In the field of political economy, two main perspectives have dominated the analysis. The first argument is that Latin America's specialization in primary commodities is complementary to China's economic structure. Unlike the United States that often seeks to protect politically sensitive agricultural sectors (Frieden 1988) , China is not a source of commodity competition. Rather, China seeks to import the primary goods, like soybeans, that Latin American can produce cheaply and efficiently. Hence, rebalancing trade ties with China should improve the region's welfare (Santiso 2007 ) and even its security (Escudé 2011) . By contrast, other political economy analysts are more skeptical about the relative merits of Chinese trade interdependence. According to this perspective, China may be as much of a threat as an opportunity. In other words, China's booming demand for commodities and its highly competitive manufacturing sector is reinforcing a dependency relationship in Latin America (Jenkins 2010 (Jenkins , 2012 Ortiz 2012) . As the region further specializes in commodity production to meet Chinese demand, its manufacturing sectors are simultaneously contracting under the weight of increased Chinese competition (Moreira 2007, Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010) . This asymmetric relationship ultimately leaves the region exposed to a severe commodity correction that could impair Latin American growth and development.
My argument seeks to complement this literature focusing on the welfare effects of China's deepening economic integration by offering a systematic examination of how this structural transformation affects the specific policy choices of individual Latin American nations. In other words, notwithstanding the direct economic effects of Chinese integration, do governments have more or less room to maneuver their economic policies compared to periods of time when they were primarily sourcing funds from Western nations?
The international relations literature reflects a similar dichotomy, with scholars arriving at divergent conclusions about the security implications of growing Chinese-Latin American interdependence. The `realist' perspective is deeply suspicious of Chinese motives (Mearsheimer 6 2001), perceiving China's Western Hemispheric expansion as part of a geopolitical strategy to mitigate the unilateral power of the United States regionally and globally (Lanxin 2008) . Some analysts, for example, question the motivation behind China becoming a key supplier of military hardware to Venezuela (Ellis 2011) . Other scholars have offered a more nuanced assessment of China's role in the region, but they are nevertheless cautious about the country's aspirations. Battling an increasingly negative image 6 in the wake of the influx of low-end manufacturing exports to Latin America, China has funneled billions of dollars into improving its global reputation. Whether investing in soft power yields dividends, 7 however, remains unclear amid ongoing concerns about its economic threat, corrupt business practices, human rights record, and growing military power (Shambaugh 2013). 8 Notwithstanding these multi-dimensional concerns about the rise of China, many thinkers suggest that China's presence in Latin America is solely driven by economics, offering little challenge to the United States' regional influence (Roett and Paz 2008; Stallings 2008; Tokatlian 2008) . In other words, China primarily hopes to secure raw materials for its home market and a destination for its manufactured goods in foreign markets. Political stability is central to these goals, and hence, the Chinese government has little interest in sparking anti-American sentiment in the region, or even participating in populist regional institutions like the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA).
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My analysis brings a new set of considerations to this work by employing a systematic comparative analysis of the shifting economic power balance between the United States and China in the Western Hemisphere. The Chinese government's stated intentions for its Latin American 6 2012 Global Pew Attitudes Survey regarding public opinion of China in Brazil and Mexico. 7 `Soft power' describes the ability to attract and co-opt (through culture, political values, or legitimacy) rather than coerce (through military force of financial incentives) as a means of persuasion (Nye 2004) . 8 Note that China's military presence in the region remains limited, with China's first military deployment to the region in September 2004 being part of United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti. 9 Ironically, scholars have found that China gives the least diplomatic priority to those countries with overriding political motivations --such as Venezuela and Cuba --preferring instead to forge the deepest relations with those countries that 7 expansion include securing access to energy and raw material resources for its domestic market and developing internationally-competitive firms (Chen 2008) . Government officials also appear to prioritize more than simply commerce when they discuss the importance of the region's role in "creating a more multi-polar world and increasing the democratization of international relations."
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While assessing China's political motivations behind its Westward expansion is beyond the scope of this paper, the heft of its rising regional footprint has important policy implications for the region. Even if we assume that China has the most benign diplomatic intentions, China unquestionably has become a huge economic player in the Western Hemisphere --a role which may have unintended political consequences. These findings support recent literature showing that China's global economics and politics are inextricably linked (Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013). In fact, I expect that the region's growing Chinese interdependence places both opportunities and constraints on national policy making that endow governments with more room to maneuver beyond a traditional Western governance approach that emphasizes minimal economic intervention.
The article unfolds as follows. The next section contains the main theoretical contribution; here I explain how China's growing economic interdependence has helped increase national policy discretion. In Section 3, I provide qualitative empirical support for this theory using comparative case studies in Latin America, a region that has seen a rapid Chinese economic expansion in the last few decades. Finally, I close by discussing the study's broader scholarly and political implications.
Theoretical Framework: Non-Conditional Lending Boosts Autonomy
Latin American history is replete with episodes of leftist governance, but what accounts for the recent resilience of the Latin American left? Governments like Argentina and Venezuela have been China deems most salient economically --such as Argentina and Brazil (Domínguez 2006 or the availability of resources to fund budget shortfalls. For developing country governments facing strong redistributive pressures, sufficient fiscal space to supply more jobs, higher wages, and better public services is often key to their political survival. To finance such domestic political agendas, however, developing country governments often must borrow externally to a much greater extent than rich countries. Indeed, underdeveloped financing markets and tax collection leaves these governments with considerably fewer internal funding options than developed countries (Gavin and Perotti 1997) .
Without such financing, governments lack the capacity to fund their domestic political initiatives and respond to economic shocks countercyclically with deficit spending (Pinto 2010) . For example, a Keynesian policy response like the United States' massive deficit spending during its 2008 financial crisis had historically proved much more difficult for crisis-ridden developing countries.
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Latin American governments first attempted to overcome this problem by financing their domestic political initiatives with an "inflation tax," which entailed printing money or borrowing money from the central bank to cover budget shortfalls. Monetizing their government deficits, however, catalyzed a period of runaway inflation known as hyperinflation in the 1980s. This 11 A burgeoning scholarly literature offers a variety of classification schemes to explain the rise of the left and its consequences for Latin America (Panizza 2005; Castañeda 2006; Lynch 2007; Weyland 2009; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011) . 12 Fiscal space can be defined as the availability of budget room that allows governments to provide resources for a desired purpose without any prejudice to the sustainability of a government's financial position (IMF 2005) . 13 The 2008 global financial crisis was the first time that many Latin American countries were able to pursue countercyclical policies to offset economic weakness. 9 traumatic price shock not only delivered a sizeable income shock to the living standards of Latin American citizens, but also pushed many of them below the poverty line.
After eventually stabilizing hyperinflation, many Latin American governments decided to instead raise external financing by issuing sovereign bonds in global capital markets. Their eventual overreliance on capital market financing, however, placed their domestic policy choices under the microscope of international investors. In return for global market financing, they were expected to follow certain conditions and sacrifice some policy sovereignty (Vreeland 2003 ; also see Nelson 2015) , most notably in the area of fiscal policy. Investors favored austerity in the wake of the region's past struggles with hyperinflation. Against the backdrop of the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s, investors were skeptical of government intervention in the economy, fearing that large government deficits would once again catalyze inflation and jeopardize debt repayment. They instead favored control of budget deficits as a pathway to low inflation and economic stability.
Ironically, bond financing like central bank credit previously left countries vulnerable to economic crises. If governments did not pursue the market's calls for budget discipline, they risked instigating a new round of economic volatility grounded in investor capital flight. Investors could either refuse to renew their financing, or dump their bonds in secondary markets, creating severe credit shocks and financing pressures for governments.
Despite the political costs of such austerity, there was little political resistance during this period.
The traditional left in Latin America may have historically viewed the budget as an essential tool for addressing redistributive pressures, but it either acquiesced or mounted little opposition to neoliberal movements (Roberts 1998; Stokes 2001; Murillo 2001; Murillo 2002; Weyland 2002; Levitsky 2003) .
Fiscal policy was more or less forfeited as a key policymaking tool in favor of the market's budget discipline, including using fiscal deficits and social safety nets during periods of economic distress (Mosley 2000 (Mosley , 2003 Wibbels 2006) . Notwithstanding this historic pattern of budget retrenchment, I hypothesize that the availability of non-Western financing sources, from the China-fueled commodity boom and state-owned institutions like the Chinese Development Bank, has increased the policy discretion of Latin American governments to more heavily intervene in their economies with higher budget deficits (see H 1 below). Over the last decade, China's increasing inroads into Latin America have endowed nations with an attractive alternative to funding government deficits. Rather than pursuing market austerity to attract bond market capital, governments that either defaulted on their debt or refused to comply with market conditionality, such as Ecuador or Venezuela, could instead spend freely on their political priorities. to deliver more revenues than simply relying on those more indirectly linked to China-fueled growth.
For example, Argentina has opted to mostly tax commodity flows, keeping its borrowing from China below 5 percent of GDP and mainly targeted toward transportation infrastructure. This has helped relieve some of the country's fiscal constraints, but the country has struggled to raise sufficient tax receipts to cover its expenditures. Export taxes, which account for more than ten percent of total government revenues, 23 have been an important source of government finance. In fact, China's surging demand for soybeans, critical to its food security and social stability, has also helped feed Argentine politicians. Tax receipts from Argentina's thriving soybean exports 24 have allowed politicians to invest in domestic priorities, such as energy and transportation subsidies that benefit the urban working and middle classes.
However, direct trade taxation has its political limits, and has not delivered as much budgetary flexibility as non-conditional lending. Reliant on central bank financing to cover its budgetary shortfalls, Argentina has had to be somewhat wary of budget deficits, out of fear that severely monetizing the deficit will aggravate inflationary pressures. Hence, since the onset of Chinese lending to the region, Argentina's budget deficit has not reached the same heights as Ecuador and Venezuela (see Figure 1 ). Relative to Brazil which engages in very little direct taxation or Chinese borrowing (a mere 1 percent of its GDP), however, Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela have had more policy flexibility to stimulate their economies, and been free of the fiscal austerity that is often imposed by the international investment community. 
Comparative Case Evidence

Research Design and Case Selection
To test the above hypotheses, I conduct a comparative case study analysis across three countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, using national-level government policies as the unit of analysis. These three countries are similar along economic and political indicators, (they are presidential, middle-income South American countries), yet they maximize the variation in the main independent variables of interest (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) . I focus the analysis on three cases with mixed-market economies, 25 based on the assumption that these countries would be most likely to veer away from market governance models based on fiscal discipline. I can then test whether or not directly raising revenues from Chinese financing streams leads to greater fiscal drift.
According to a variety of economic measures, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are often considered mix-market economies relative to their upper-middle income counterparts in South financing from global markets, they continue operating within the confines of an economic model grounded in fiscal discipline. These governments take a more passive approach, only indirectly benefiting from the higher revenues associated with China-fueled economic growth.
This pattern also shows that increased Chinese economic interdependence alone does not necessarily lead to greater policy flexibility (see Table 1 Perhaps, most importantly, the channel for this funding operates through Brazilian government concessions rather than direct, government-to-government lending. The Chinese Development
Bank might offer project finance that helps a Chinese company secure a winning bid for public services, but it does not funnel proceeds into national development funds like in Venezuela. The market acts as the intermediary, rather than the government. In other words, investment is more insulated from government intervention, or as the Chinese embassy official framed it in our interview, "it's more market-oriented in Brazil." Even if Brazil was to receive greater Chinese investment, its private procurement system would likely constrain the government from considerable budgetary drift.
By comparison, Venezuela provides us with a case of direct government-to-government funding, given that China and Venezuela established a joint financing mechanism, known as the Table 1 ).
In addition to government-to-government borrowing, there is another possible channel for directly raising revenues from Chinese income streams. As discussed above, the Argentine government has sourced funds from the trade sector, reaping new tax receipts from excise duties levied on commodity exports, including massive soybean shipments to China.
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Argentina has opted for trade taxation because, unlike Brazil, the country cannot rely on global market financing to fund its expenditures. Argentina's outstanding difficulties with its holdout creditors have closed its spigot from global market capital, leaving the country in search of alternative financing streams. However, Argentina is far less reliant on Chinese bank loans (see Figure 1) than Venezuela, and has only more recently begun to attract such investment for some new public works projects.
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Compared to bank loans, however, government revenues derived from trade are often not as bountiful and are also more volatile and politically unpopular. Thus, I anticipate that export revenues may help temporarily boost government spending, but not in a sustained manner (see Table 1 ).
30 About one-fifth of export tax revenues can be attributed to Chinese commodity demand. In 2010, the country was the recipient of about 17 percent of Argentina's primary commodity exports (Calculated from the United Nation's Commodity Trade Statistics Database). 31 Argentina has received $14.1 billion in Chinese Development Bank (CDB) loans since 2010, or about one-quarter of Venezuela's total bank loans. These proceeds were mainly targeted toward new public train and subway infrastructure (Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski 2013) . 
Venezuela: Chinese Lending Offsets Commodity Correction
Oil has long been the lifeline of Venezuelan politics, delivering more than US$1 trillion into state coffers over the last 60 years. Benefiting from this exorbitant wealth, Venezuelan politicians often exhibit the classic symptoms of the resource curse (Karl 1997; Ross 1999) . Without the accountability that derives from broad taxation, 33 politicians frequently and freely spend today with little concern for the health of finances tomorrow. For example, Venezuela's three previous oil booms (see Figure 2 below) all ended in fiscal crises characterized by depressed oil prices and empty 32 Fearon (1991) argues that counterfactual propositions play a necessary and fundamental role in the efforts of political scientists to assess their hypotheses about the causes of the phenomena that they study. 33 Personal and corporate income taxes account for 9 percent of total revenues (Rodríguez, Morales, and Monaldi 2012) . According to the CDB's Vice Governor Liu Kegu, who is charged with managing Latin American operations, this relationship is mutually beneficial. Unlike credit rating agencies that fret about Venezuela's sovereign risk because of its volatile commodity prices, ballooning deficits, and swelling off-balance sheet obligations, Kegu was comforted by the country's rich oil reserves. 37 Beginning in 2005, both the Central Bank of Venezuela, and the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, have been legally obliged to deposit money in the National Development Fund, which is directly controlled by the president. 38 Economist Intelligence Unit. 39 Oil-for-loan agreements were first popularized by Japan in the 1980s, when the country had extended similar loans to China (Gallagher et. al 2012) . 40 For example, State Grid Corporation, China's largest power distributor, is building power transmission equipment in Caracas, while the telecommunications firm ZTE has been constructing a fiber optic cable network in Venezuela. State-owned China Railway Group also won a contract from the Venezuelan Railway Authority. 41 Venezuela holds 20 percent of the world's crude oil reserves, much of which is extra-heavy crude from the Orinoco Oil Belt (Rodríguez, Morales, and Monaldi 2012).
If Chinese financing was not available, it's hard to imagine that Venezuela could have continued to unabatedly invest in Chávez's political priorities. In fact, the state oil producer PDVSA, Chávez's preferred off-balance sheet funding arm throughout the 2000s, was also showing signs of severe financing strain by the end of the decade. After having funneled almost $30 billion to the president's development fund during the decade, the lack of reinvestment in the state oil company was not only hurting PDVSA's productivity, 43 but also forcing it to increasingly borrow from global capital markets. By 2011, PDVSA's debt had reached $35 billion, which was equivalent to the amount it had funneled through FONDEN, meaning the state-oil company had effectively financed a massive subsidy to the government for its social programs. Borrowing at high interest rates from global markets while siphoning its oil proceeds directly to the Venezuelan central government, however, was not sustainable over the long-run.
Without Chinese lending, the central government would have thus had to borrow more in global capital markets. In 2010, the major credit rating agencies, S&P, Moody's, and Fitch, had already rated Venezuela's sovereign debt below investment grade, suggesting new funding would not have come cheap. Incurring more debt would have likely subjected Venezuela to greater investor scrutiny and perhaps even austerity.
In the wake of Hugo Chávez's 2013 death, his successor Nicolás Maduro has continued to use Chinese loan-for-oil agreements as a funding arm for its expenditures. The Maduro government borrows from China, often below its market rate, to boost politically-important spending today.
Since 2008, Venezuela has now tapped more than $50 billion --equivalent to 22 percent of GDP --in non-conditional Chinese lending. Without having to adhere to the market's calls for discipline, the country has maintained its economic policy autonomy, overseeing a large primary budget deficit 42 See Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013. 43 The state oil company was producing about 3 million dollars of oil daily compared to its goal of 4 million dollars.
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since the global financial crisis (see Figure 1) . It has also further expanded its off-balance sheet social spending through both FONDEN and the China-Venezuela joint investment fund.
However, with about one-half of its 640,000 barrels of daily oil production destined for the Pacific, 44 such borrowing comes at the cost of the state-oil company's health tomorrow. While PDVSA has always underwritten the Venezuelan government with its current proceeds, it's now leveraging its future oil assets and profitability to keep the government in the black, casting a cloud over the country's future solvency.
These loan-for-oil agreements also create a moral hazard problem for China that is similar the one experienced by U.S. banks during the 1980's Latin American debt crisis. If the Chinese Development Bank were to cut financing to Venezuela out of concern that the country's ongoing spending might jeopardize its credit standing, a likely default could impede the flow of Venezuela's oil shipments to China. On the other hand, if China continues to extend new credit to Venezuela, it may temporarily stave off any potential financial difficulties. However, such defensive lending risks further catalyzing moral hazard. The Maduro government may prefer to spend rather than reform, sowing the seeds for an even deeper debt crisis.
To date, China has opted to lend defensively, with President Xi Jinpeng extending the China-Venezuela fund by another US$4 billion during his Latin American tour this summer. More recently, at Venezuela's request, China's government also decided to loosen the terms of its loan-for-oil agreements by both removing the minimum quantities for oil shipments and extending repayment deadlines. Over the longer run, the question is how long China is willing to extend such preferential conditions. High ranking Chinese officials are already expressing their discontent about their financial relationship with Venezuela, with one recently complaining that "we thought we were 44 Financial Times, October 22, 2014. 23 getting into a cruise ship, but it was a pirate ship." Primary commodity exports were the main driver of these trade ties, accounting for about two-fifths of China's total trade with Argentina.
The government took advantage of China's booming demand for its commodities by increasing its export taxes, particularly on soybeans. By comparison, Argentina received relatively few direct investment or bank loans from China during this period.
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It primarily sourced funds from its trade relationship with China until the commodity boom slowed and export taxes became politically less viable. Like in Venezuela, the commodity correction increased the incentive for Argentina to forge greater financial ties with China, albeit at a slower pace. Hence, Argentina provides us with an intermediate case, where China's soybean demand gave a temporary boost to government revenues in Argentina, but not a sustained boost in fiscal flexibility (see Table 1 of the Economy, Jorge Remes Lenicov, the export tax was temporary and intended to protect social programs in "the face of the crisis." 48 In its quest for new tax receipts, the government also increased the export tax on soybeans from 3.5 to 23.5 percent (Figure 3 organizations. First, the tax tempered the fast-paced agricultural export growth -which led to greater domestic supply and lower food prices -providing a benefit to the urban middle and working classes that still had memories of runaway inflation. Second, it boosted government revenues, endowing the central government with greater fiscal scope to target its urban political supporters with higher social spending, public employment, and energy and transportation subsidies.
The key link between this government policy and China was soybeans. Soybeans were the main contributor to government revenues, accounting for more than three times the export revenue of beef and wheat combined (Turzi 2012) . At the same time, China's growing economic interdependence was largely responsible for the soybean boom. At the turn of the 21st century, China's policy of soybean self-sufficiency had limited its share of global consumption to six percent.
However, as the country's domestic consumption patterns changed, the government scrapped its . 53 The 1994 constitutional reform had banned Néstor Kirchner from running for successive presidencies. 54 The tax was a sliding scale system that would rise and fall along with commodity prices.
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Minister of the Economy, Martín Lousteau:
"They increased taxation because prices were booming -it was kind of a windfall tax...Soybeans were giving you lots of revenues. Prices were going up, production was going up, and the tax rate was going up...I think there was resistance because you were increasing it all the time...but also because Kirchner had entered conflict with the farmers since the very beginning, so they were really tired...and the farmers think your taking too much from them." 55
In fact, farmers swiftly rejected this new tax system, launching a series of major strikes and government protests that included road blockades that impeded the flow of food to urban centers.
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Suggesting that soybean farmers were better off than most Argentines, President Cristina Fernández attempted to rally the urban working class, saying that if they are forced to "take away these export taxes, everything that you have gotten in these past six years will be lost unemployment will return, prices will rise."
57
She instead saw her approval ratings plummet for mismanaging the crisis.
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After the measure was rejected in the Senate, the Kirchner government eventually revoked the resolution.
In light of these political tensions, Argentina's attempt at leveraging the China-fueled commodity boom by shrinking the margins of soybean exporters was short-lived. During the Néstor Kirchner administration, government officials had used these export taxes to pad government coffers for four years, helping ensure budget surpluses. However, squeezing these margins eventually became politically untenable, leaving President Cristina Fernández searching for alternative funding sources. The ensuing commodity correction (see Figure 3) Navigating through the commodity slump, however, still meant unwinding some of the government's utility subsidies.
Hoping to avoid further fiscal retrenchment, the Argentina president increasingly courted China.
In a 2010 visit with her Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao agreed to lend the Argentine government more than US$10 billion, equivalent to 5 percent of GDP, to update Argentina's heavily subsidized national railways with Chinese trains and equipment.
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The added resources relieved some budgetary pressure by raising external capital for much-needed public infrastructure, leaving
Kirchner with more fiscal space to maintain an expansionary policy stance through her successful 2011 reelection bid. However, they were about one-quarter of the size of the Chinese bank loans to Venezuela, and therefore did not deliver the same degree of fiscal flexibility (see Figure 1) . Today, the Kirchner government still struggles to raise new tax receipts to help it avoid fiscal restraint.
These funding problems have been exacerbated by Argentina's July 2014 technical default on its global bond holdings, prompting the Kirchner administration to tap additional Chinese financing.
Initially, Argentina had hoped to address its financing shortfalls by re-entering global capital markets.
Over the last year, the Kirchner government had implemented a variety of policy measures, aimed at restoring its credibility with international investors. It had finally repaid its long-standing arrears with 60 In an effort to re-open the spigot of global market financing, Cristina Kirchner negotiated a settlement with two-thirds of the outstanding holdouts from Argentina's 2005 debt restructuring in 2010. However, legal disputes involving the remaining original bondholders, the recent YPF nationalization, and the United States' opposition to new multilateral lending would likely place a high premium on any new sovereign bond issuance in international markets. 61 The private pension system was established in 1994 as an alternative to the public system, and had $30 billion in assets in 2008 (See Datz 2012 for more details). 62 Notably, the latter action also led to the ouster of Central Bank President Martin Redrado, who hoping to preserve central bank independence, protested against the presidential decree. 63 Argentina agreed to purchase 20 diesel locomotives and 220 passenger trains from China. 
Brazil: Between Markets and Dragons
Unlike Argentina and Venezuela, the Brazilian government has taken a more passive stance to leveraging the region's growing economic interdependence with China. Notwithstanding being China's largest regional trading and investment partner, the government has not heavily taxed the export sector, 67 or significantly relied on the Chinese Development Bank's financing facility (see Figure 1) . Rather, the majority of Chinese investment projects have been market-seeking and thus channeled through the private sector.
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To the extent that the Chinese Development Bank is involved in public financing projects in Brazil, it operates through government concessions rather than direct government-to-government lending like in Venezuela. Hence, according to Alexandre Schwartsman, former director of the international affairs department at the Central Bank of Brazil, 66 Reuters, July 19, 2014. 67 Most exports are exempt from foreign trade taxes, which amount to less than 1 percent of GDP.
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"it's far more difficult for the government to put its hand on the money."
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In terms of its approach to public financing, Brazil has been less interventionist than its regional counterparts with mixed-market economies, and hence, less likely to create economic distortions through new trade taxes or discretionary borrowing. Rather, the majority of its government revenues are derived from domestic consumption and income taxes (see Table 2 President Rousseff swiftly responded with a set of proposals to curb corruption and increase government investment in education, health, and public transportation.
Improving the quality and accessibility of public education, health care, and transportation is no small feat, however, and likely necessitates massive new spending commitments. Hence, placating the growing demands of Brazil's middle class could simultaneously threaten the government's budget discipline, and in turn undermine Brazil's investment climate.
In searching for an exit from this political quagmire, the Brazilian government might be tempted to tap Chinese income streams either through trade taxation or direct borrowing from "Chinese firms are prepositioning themselves to finance infrastructure in Brazil. They will be ready to finance major capital projects. If you think about the size of the investment that we are going to have to make in Brazil in regards to infrastructure in the next five years...Not only don't we have enough money to invest, but also, in order to do everything that must be done, we need to relay on third parties. We need to invite foreign players through bids for airports, highways, and ports." 87
In short, Chinese capital is likely to be channeled through the Brazilian private sector. Such procurement strategies could allow the Brazilian government to simultaneously meet its twin goals of economic and social stability. The government can maintain budget discipline by using private-public partnerships to defray the cost of big-ticket capital projects, while still quieting the growing chorus of demands for better Brazilian public services.
agreements in countries with strong trade and investment ties with China (McDowell and Liao 2015) . 85 Author's interview, Brasilia, Brazil, September 27, 2014.
Conclusion
After excessive borrowing led to financial booms and busts, many countries have sought to insulate themselves from market volatility, and to varying degrees, diversify away from neoliberal governance. In this regard, China's rapid economic expansion in the Western Hemisphere has presented regional governments with an important opportunity. The availability of non-Western financing sources, derived from these new trade and investment ties, provides governments with an income stream that is independent of global financial markets.
In this comparative case study analysis, we examined three mixed-market South American economies, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, to test whether this non-conditional funding has the potential to enhance national budgetary autonomy. We found considerable variation within these mixed-market economies. The Brazilian government, which predominately relies on market financing and has not directly borrowed from China, has maintained budget discipline, notwithstanding its microeconomic tendency to subsidize credit to consumers and businesses. By contrast, Argentina and Venezuela have attempted to directly tap Chinese income streams to finance their expenditures. Argentina's government opted to tax trade, which provided a temporary but not sustainable boost to its budgetary flexibility. The Venezuelan authorities, on the other hand, have tapped non-conditional government-to-government Chinese financing, which has considerably enhanced their capacity to sustain wider budget deficits and greater levels of economic intervention.
These patterns appear to hold beyond the borders of these three countries. For example, if we briefly extend our analysis to two of Venezuela's Andean neighbors, Colombia and Ecuador, we observe a similar set of outcomes. The Colombia government, which relies on global market financing and has borrowed a mere US$75 million from China (0.02 percent of its annual GDP), 86 Part of the Brazilian continental shelf where an estimated 50 billion barrels of oil reserves was recently discovered.
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has maintained a primary budget surplus since China's lending began to the region in the late 2000s.
Like Brazil, Colombia prefers to finance its infrastructure needs through private sector procurement, which heightens its focus on using good governance to promote a favorable business environment.
The country has even enshrined its commitment to fiscal responsibility into Article 334 of its constitution, declaring that "fiscal sustainability is a criterion that should guide the branches and institutions of government." Without being subject to global market pressures, Ecuador has simultaneously moved its government budget sharply into the red from a primary surplus in 2008 into a sizeable and sustained deficit today. During this time, the country also negotiated a multi-billion dollar deal with the Chinese Development Bank to drill for oil under Yasuni National Park in order to "obtain access to a favorable line of credit to finance priority projects," despite having a U.N. backed-trust that was set up to collect donations to deter oil development in the Amazon rain forest.
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In other words, it appears as though Chinese financing can amplify a country's political and economic trajectory, by providing countries like Ecuador and Venezuela with greater fiscal space to pursue their political agendas without the scrutiny of international investors or global governance norms.
In this regard, these findings offer important new insights for both the international relations 
